Abstract:
The choice of a baseline against which to evaluate changes in carbon stocks is 1 a critical component of any forest carbon offset market. In this paper we use a discrete 2 dynamic programming model and data from a lodgepole pine (pinus contorta) stand in 3 northeastern British Columbia, Canada, to demonstrate that different baselines have little 4 or no effect on optimal harvest decision, but can have a large impact on economic returns 5 to a landowner. The results reveal that the magnitude of the financial return to the 6 landowner is dependent on the starting conditions of both the predetermined baseline and 7 the proposed carbon offset project. The study also shows that when given the choice 8 between alternative baselines, a landowner will always choose a fixed baseline over a 9 business-as-usual (BAU) baseline. emitters to contribute to a reduction in the rate of change of the amount of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and 3 other greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere. The simple explanation is that if these other 4 entities are able to sequester more greenhouse gases or to release less as a result of a change in 5 practices, they may be able to earn carbon offset credits and sell them to large emitters, which will 6 help the large emitters meet CO 2 emission reduction obligations. 7
The first fully functioning compliance carbon market in North America is in the province of 8
Alberta, Canada. A number of carbon offset quantification protocols have been developed in Alberta 9
(Climate Change Central, 2011) including an afforestation protocol (now retracted for revisions) and 10 a forest harvest practices protocol. In the recent past, there was considerable discussion about the 11 development of a forest management protocol for the Alberta offset system: this discussion provided 12 the impetus for the current study (AFGO, 2010a,b,c). The Alberta Forest Growth Organization 13 (AFGO) organized a number of workshops in January, May and October of 2010 to discuss forest 14 carbon offset system for the province of Alberta, Canada. Canada, 2009). These protocols set the rules about how carbon credits will be calculated and 19
verified. Forest owners in North America may be able to sell carbon offset credits to emitters 20 through various voluntary markets, ranging from easements with non-governmental organizations to 21 negotiating directly with carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emitters (Rudell et al., 2006) . Carbon offset markets 22 D r a f t are developing and, in the voluntary market, forest carbon offsets are one of the most traded carbon 1 offsets, as revealed by an online survey of suppliers, brokers, and carbon credit accounting registries 2 from all over the world (Hamilton et al., 2007 (Hamilton et al., , 2008 . However, forest carbon offsets present some 3 unique challenges for technical legitimacy, in particular the issues of additionality. 4
Additionality is key to the credibility of offsetting. We define additionality as the net amount 5 of carbon sequestered, in excess of a predetermined baseline carbon stocks (or the net amount of 6
carbon sequestered above what would have occurred, if no incentives for carbon management were 7 present). Without additionality, a carbon offset project may actually cause an increase in greenhouse 8 gas (GHG) levels, undermining the purpose (and credibility) of the carbon offset market. But 9 demonstrating additionality can be difficult due to the subjectivity of project baselines. A baseline is 10 the reference against which a project's carbon storage or GHG emission reductions are measured. 11
Carbon sequestration levels or emission reductions in excess of the predetermined baseline level are 12 considered additional and, thus, available for sale as offsets. Therefore, setting an accurate baseline 13 is important in designing a credible forest carbon offset market. 14 Two main types of baselines are discussed in this study in relation to forest carbon offset 15 projects. The first type is called the fixed baseline or a base year approach. This approach uses a 16 fixed level of carbon stocks as the baseline: it could be the carbon stock at the beginning of the 17 project. With this approach, stock changes are calculated by comparing changes of a proposed 18 project's carbon stocks from one reporting period to the next; beginning from the base year (see 19 panel a of Fig. 1 ). This type of baseline was the baseline of choice for the now defunct Chicago 20
Climate Exchange, to determine additionality for managed forest offsets (Pearson et al., 2008 ) 21
The second type of baseline uses a counterfactual business-as-usual (BAU) approach. With These baselines are by no means perfect as they have both been criticized. The fixed 8 baseline approach has been criticized because it does not consider the amount of sequestration that 9 would have occurred had the project not been implemented, creating uncertainty about whether the 10 project "caused" any of the measured changes in sequestration levels. On the other hand, the BAU 11 approach has been criticized because it relies on counterfactual model projections of carbon stocks 12 made many years, sometimes decades, into the future. This creates a situation with information 13 asymmetry, as nobody except the project proponent can know what he really would have done in 14 the absence of a market, thus making it possible for the proponent to game the system. Therefore, 15 neither baseline approach can be used to assess unequivocally whether, or to what extent, a 16 project's carbon sequestration impact is additional to what would have occurred without the project 17 (Beane et al.,2008) . 18 We do recognize that there are other challenges such as managing for leakage and 19 permanence that can affect the credibility of any forest carbon offset market, but our focus in this 20 study is on additionality and baseline setting. We do not address leakage and permanence because 21 their inclusion in this study will not impact the story we are trying to convey to our readers. Our 22 D r a f t purpose is to provide landowners, natural resource managers, policymakers and other interested 1 parties, some basic information on how the choice of a baseline will impact optimal harvest decision 2 or a landowner's decision to manage for carbon. 3
To facilitate the comparison of the different baselines, we used a stand level optimization 4 approach because understanding stand level carbon dynamics is essential to addressing forest carbon 5 sequestration. Many management actions that influence aggregate carbon stocks at the forest level 6
are carried out at the stand level. In the forest economics literature, most of the stand level study as the fixed baseline approach to determine optimal harvest age. None, to the best of our 10 knowledge have used the BAU baseline in the determination of optimal harvest age. The choice of 11 harvest age is a fundamental decision in an even-aged silvicultural system. Delaying the harvest age 12 allows stands to increase in volume, thereby storing more carbon (Asante et al., 2011; Asante and 13 Armstrong, 2012). The work presented here is an extension of the previous work by Asante et al. 14 (2011), which only considered the fixed baseline. In this study, both the fixed baseline and the BAU 15 baseline were used to investigate the optimal harvest behaviour of a landowner. The primary 16 contribution of this study to the literature on optimal economic rotation is the discovery that different 17 baselines have little or no effect on optimal harvest decision, but can have a large impact on 18 economic returns to a landowner. This knowledge can help decision makers in the design of a forest 19 carbon offset market. 20 Similar to Asante et al. (2011) , a dynamic programming model is developed to find the 21 optimal stand management decision when both timber values and carbon sequestration services are 22 considered. The choice of dynamic programming approach is based on the fact that it is a powerful 23 D r a f t approach to stand level optimization problems (Brodie and Haight, 1985) . It allows one to solve 1 many different types of sequential optimization problems in a time frame for which a naive approach 2 would take exponential time. The forest stand in this dynamic programming problem is described in 3 terms of the initial and current age of the stand and the initial and current mass of carbon stored in 4 the dead organic matter (DOM) pool. DOM as used in this study is a generic term for all dead 5 organic compounds in a forest stand, including standing dead trees, down trees, coarse and fine 6 woody debris, litter and soil carbon. 7
Carbon stored in long-lived products such as lumber is not considered in this model. Asante 8 and Armstrong (2012) did consider the wood product pool using many of the same assumptions 9 used in this paper. The effect of including the product pool on management decisions was small, and 10 because this study is about comparing alternative baselines under the same treatment, the inclusion 11 of the product pool would not impact the story we are trying to convey to our readers. Therefore, a 12 decision was made to ignore the wood product pool for this study.
13
The dynamic programming model is used to address the following four main objectives: 14
(1) We want to understand if the choice of a baseline can be used as an incentive to encourage a 15 landowner to increase forest carbon sequestration. That is, we want to know if the choice of a 16 predetermined baseline can result in a longer optimal rotation age. We will answer this question 17 by examining the sensitivity of optimal harvest age to carbon prices using different baseline 18
policies. 19
(2) Using a fixed baseline, we showed in Asante et al. (2011) that the starting conditions of a stand 20 in a proposed carbon offset project can have a big impact on financial returns to a landowner. 21
Against this background, we want to investigate if the story would be the same with different 22
baselines. This will be done by examining the sensitivity of the value of land, timber, and carbon 23 D r a f t sequestration services (LTCV, hereafter) to starting stand age. 1 (3) Thirdly, we want to be able to rank the alternative baselines in terms of their impact on financial 2 returns to the landowner. 
Timber yield and cost functions 8
The parameter values used to estimate the timber yield function are from Asante et al. where ‫ܤ‬ሺܽሻ is the mass of carbon in tC/ha, stored in the living trees at age a as defined above, and 10 ‫ܦ‬ ௧ is the mass of carbon in tC/ha, stored in the dead organic matter pool. The decay rate, ∝ and 11 litter fall rate ߚ, were estimated using the method of least squares to find the parameters ∝ and ߚ 12 
Alternative Baselines 1
Three different types of predetermined baselines were considered in this study: fixed 2 baselines and two different types of BAU baselines. Baselines are generated based on the best 3 estimate of how a forest landowner would manage the forest stand if there are no carbon 4 sequestration incentives, i.e. when the price of carbon is set to 0 CAD/tCO 2 . The section that 5 follows describes the selection process for the two types of BAU baselines. 6 7
Selection process for BAU baseline 8
Two types of hypothetical projections of carbon sequestration levels are assumed for the 9 BAU baseline in this paper, based on the best estimate of how a forest landowner would have 10 managed the forest stand if there were no carbon sequestration incentives. The rationale is, with 11 no carbon incentives (i.e. when price of carbon is 0 CAD/tCO 2 ), a landowner will not delay the 12 harvest age beyond the rotation age that maximizes the land expectation value (LEV) for timber 13 only (i.e. Faustmann rotation age) or the rotation age at maximum sustained yield (MSY) timber 14 volume. MSY is the largest yield that can be harvested which does not deplete the resource 15 on TEC stocks derived from a forest that is managed using an even-aged silvicultural system with 1 the objective of maximizing sustained yield timber volume and economic returns respectively. 2
To derive a BAU baseline, a three step procedure is followed. 3 (a) The rotation age is calculated. In the case of the MSY baseline, the volume maximization 4 sustained yield rotation age is the stand age where the mean annual increment (MAI) is 5 maximized, which is 88 years in this study. For the Faustmann baseline, the optimal economic 6 rotation is the stand age where the marginal return from allowing a stand to grow another year 7 equals the opportunity cost of the capital that would be generated from harvesting the current 8 crop and regenerating the site, thereby maximizing the value of the forest land (Pearse, 1990) . 9
This paper used the discrete-time version of the Faustmann formula (Eq. 3) (Faustmann, 10 1849) to derive the Faustmann baseline. 11
For the data used, the optimal economic rotation age of the stand is 73 years 13 (b) The mass of carbon stored in the living trees is estimated using the biomass function: 14
య , so that stand age ܽ, runs from initial age to the age where harvest is 15 optimized. The initial age is reset to 1 year in the year after harvest and the process is repeated. 16 (c) Finally, the DOM carbon stocks is then calculated for a combination of starting DOM stocks that 17 runs from 0 to 500 tC/ha. and starting stand age that runs from 0 to 250 years. The mass of 18 carbon stored in the DOM pool is estimated using equations 1 and 2 where stand age ܽ, runs 19 from initial age to the optimal harvest age. The initial age is reset to stand age 1 after harvest and 
Valuation of carbon 9
The carbon market described in this paper pays landowners for the annual sequestration of 10 CO 2 in excess of the annual changes in the baseline quantity and requires payment for net annual 11 release of CO 2 in deficit of the annual changes in the baseline quantity. The price received per tonne 12 of sequestered CO 2 is the same as the price paid per tonne of released CO 2 . In this paper, a broad 13 range of prices for CO 2 (0, 2, 20 or 40 CAD/t of CO 2 ) is used in sensitivity analysis. The range of 14 prices chosen encompasses the range of observed prices including discounting occurs to account for 15 the temporary nature of carbon sequestration in forests. It is conventional to express carbon prices in 16 currency units per t CO 2 and stocks as tonnes of carbon (tC). This practice of reporting is continued 17
here, but for modelling purposes, equivalent prices for carbon (CAD/tC) is defined as ܲ = 18 
The Model 1
The basic assumption of the model is that a forest landowner is participating in a hypothetical 2 carbon market where the landowner is paid for carbon sequestered by the forest and pays when 3 carbon is released. In this market, it is assumed that the landowner behaves like a rational landowner 4 (i.e. profit maximizing firm), in the sense of "neoclassical economics" and not in the sense of 5 "behavioral economics," which considers psychological insights into human behavior to explain 6 economic decision-making. In this market, the landowner's goal is to manage the forest for timber 7 production and carbon sequestration in a manner that earns maximum discounted financial return. 8
For simplicity, we also assume in this model that the only decision available to the landowner is 9
either to "harvest" or "delay the harvest age" in order to maximize the combined returns of both We would like to acknowledge that there are several silvicultural techniques such as 13 fertilization, herbicide treatment etc. that can be employed by a landowner to increase forest carbon 14 sequestration, but we chose not to consider these silvicultural techniques, because it is beyond the 15 scope of the study. We did not also consider these techniques because Armstrong (2014) showed that 16 it is extremely unlikely that at any reasonable discount rate, any silvicultural action beyond harvest 17 makes economic sense in the Boreal Plain ecozone of Canada (which covers northeastern British 18 Columbia). Finally, the inclusion of any of these techniques would not change the main conclusions 19 of the study. And this is why: 20
With carbon incentives, Stainback and Alavalapati (2005) were able to show that applying 21
herbicide or fertilizer to a slash pine plantation, will result in a shorter rotation age and higher 22 economic returns when compared to a scenario without these treatments. Given these findings, we 23 D r a f t can assume that the optimal rotation age and the economic returns (in our study) will also change if 1 we use any of these silvicultural techniques. However, this change will equally affect all the 2 alternative baselines considered in this paper. With the same treatment, we expect the response to be 3 the same for all the alternative baseline scenarios, although, the magnitude of the change will depend 4 on the silvicultural technique. The difference in economic returns to the landowner is mainly due to 5 differences in baseline policies. Therefore, replacing the silvicultural technique will not change the 6 major conclusions in this study. 7
In this model, each rotation begins with the establishment of a stand on bare forest land and 8 ends with a clearcut harvest after a number of years of growth. The beginning of a new rotation 9 coincides with the end of the previous rotation. The cycle of establishment, growth, and harvest is 10 assumed to repeat in perpetuity. The decision problem is represented as a dynamic program, and 11 state variables are used to describe the system at each stage of the decision problem. 12
13

Dynamic Programming Model 14
The model developed here is a discrete backwards recursion dynamic programming model. 15
The stages represent time, in one year time steps. The forest stand is described by a combination of 16 four state variables, the age of the stand (years), the initial stand age (years), carbon stocks in the 17 
incremented by one year in stage, ‫ݐ‬ + 1. 8
The change in total ecosystem carbon, ‫ܥ∆‬ ௧௦௫ at any given stage t, depends on current 9 DOM class i, initial DOM class s, a current age class j, initial age class ‫,ݔ‬ and harvest decision k. It 10 is the sum of the annual changes in project's DOM stocks less the annual changes in baseline DOM 11 stocks, and the annual changes in biomass stocks less the annual changes in baseline biomass stocks. 12
Where ݀ ௧௦ is defined as baseline DOM class i given an initial baseline DOM class s in stage ‫.ݐ‬ 13
For the no harvest case: 14 
17
The net harvest revenue for initial age ‫ݔ‬ and age class ݆, ሺ‫ܪ‬ ௫ ሻ is calculated as 18
Establishment costs are included here because it is assumed that reforestation is required, and 20 occurs, immediately after timber harvest. 21
D r a f t
The stage return or periodic payoff ሺܰ ௧ ሻ is calculated as shown in Eq. 7. The payoff is given 1 an initial age class ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ and for each of the possible harvest decisions ሺ݇ሻ. If a stand is not harvested 2 ሺ݇ = 0ሻ, the periodic payoff would be based on ‫ܥ∆‬ ௧௦௫ only. If the stand is harvested (k = 1), the 3 payoff includes payments or charges based on ‫ܥ∆‬ ௧௦௫ଵ as well as the net revenue associated with 4 timber harvesting, processing, and reestablishment. 5
In this analysis, it is assumed the objective at each stage, is to determine, for each possible 7 combination of starting stand conditions (i.e., initial stand age and initial DOM), stand age, and level 8 of DOM stock, the harvest decision that results in the maximum net present value of land and timber 9 and carbon storage for the remainder of the planning horizon. The stages in this dynamic 10 programming model correspond to the time periods in which decisions are made. It is a finite 11 horizon, deterministic model with time t measured in years. 12
Because discrete DOM classes are used, the projections from Eqs. 1 and 2 are converted to 13 the proportion of the source DOM class area that moves into two adjacent target DOM classes. 14 ݈ ௦௫ is used to represent the lower target class, and ‫ݑ‬ ௦௫ , the upper target class. ߩ ௦௫ is 15 calculated to represent the proportion that moves into the upper target class, and ሺ1 − ߩ ௦௫ ሻ as 16 the proportion that moves into the target lower class. In the notation used here, ‫ۂݕہ‬indicates the floor 17 of a real number ‫,ݕ‬ i.e. the largest integer less than or equal to ‫.ݕ‬ The fractional part of ‫ݕ‬ is indicated 18 by ‫〉ݕ〈‬ such that ‫ݕ‬ = ‫ۂݕہ‬ + ‫〉ݕ〈‬ . This assumption is justified on the basis that T is large (500 years) and the discounted value 11 of ܴ ் for any reasonable discount rate for this problem is near zero (e.g. the present value of 1 CAD 12 received 500 years in the future is 2.5 × 10 -11 CAD given a 5% discount rate). The discount factor, 13 ߜ = ሺ1 + ‫ݎ‬ሻ ିଵ , represents the relative value of a dollar received one year from now (given an 14 annual discount rate of, ‫)ݎ‬ to a dollar today. For this study, we chose a real discount rate, ‫,ݎ‬ of 5% per 15 annum: and for this analysis, ߜ = 0.9528.
Mathematically, Soil Expectation Value or Net Present 16
Value calculated in real or nominal terms is the same, as long as consistent prices and interest rates 17 are used. That is, if real costs and benefits are used, then a real rate must be used. 18
Choosing an appropriate discount rate to evaluate long term forest carbon sequestration 19 projects is difficult since there are several opinions on what constitutes an appropriate discount rate. 20
One possibility is to use the social discount rate. The Treasury Board Secretariat in Canada 21 D r a f t (Treasury Board Secretariat, 2007) recommends a social discount rate of 8% with sensitivity rates of 1 3% and 10%. We used a social discount rate of 5% because it is a fair value intended to reflect 2 society's marginal rate of substitution between consumption in different time periods. The rate also 3 represents the possibility that climate damages are positively correlated with market returns 4 (Boardman et al., 2008) . 5
The recursive objective function for this problem is given in Eq. 16. The recursive objection function selects the harvest decision for each possible starting stage and for 8 each possible combination of state variables that maximizes the net present value at each stage, 9 assuming that optimal decisions are made in all subsequent stages. It calculates a return for each of 10 the harvest decisions and selects the harvest decision that results in the maximum return as the 11 optimal choice for the state combination in that stage. 12
Eq. 17 below modifies the stage return at time zero for stands of age 0, and represents the land 13 expectation value for each initial DOM class. This incorporates establishment costs for time zero. 14 For subsequent stages, establishment costs are incorporated in Eq. 7. 
3.
Results and Discussion
18
The results presented in this section were calculated using an implementation of the 19 dynamic programming model programmed in MATLAB (Pratap, 2006) . The optimal harvest 20 decisions for a number of different carbon prices using alternative baseline policies are presented in 21 Table 1 . The results show that for different carbon prices ( ), the optimal harvest age is about 22 D r a f t the same for different baseline policies. Therefore, the choice of a baseline policy has very little 1 impact on the optimal harvest behaviour of a landowner. Put in another way, the choice of a baseline 2 will not make a difference in terms of GHG emission reduction benefits. A different baseline will not 3 cause a landowner to delay harvest or increase carbon sequestration, but as we will see later in the 4 results presented in Fig. 4 and Table 2 , it can have a large impact on financial returns to a 5 landowner. The results presented in Table 1 also show that optimal harvset age increases with 6 increase in carbon price. These results are consistent with results from other studies that show that 7 carbon price can be used as an incentive to increase forest carbon sequestration (van Kooten et al., 
Armstrong, 2012). 10
In Table 1 , the decision rule when P େ మ is 0 CAD/tCO 2 corresponds to the case when 11 timber is the only value considered. As P େ మ increases, the optimal harvest age also increases. 12
When P େ మ is 35 CAD/tCO 2 or greater, the optimal decision is to never harvest (i.e. harvest 13 age is greater than 250 years). 14
15
[ Table 1 grey. In this analysis, a young stand refers to a stand that is 50 years old or younger, and a mature 1 stand refers to a stand that is older than 50 years. 2 Panel (a) in Fig. 3 , represents the case where P େ మ = 0. Because carbon has no value, in this 3 case, the LTCV is independent of the amount of DOM stored. This means that at any given initial 4 stand age, the LTCV is the same irrespective of the initial DOM stocks. Fig. 3 also shows that a  5 landowner who begins with a younger stand will benefit more when provided with carbon 6 management incentives compared to a landowner who begins with a mature stand. This implies that 7 if a landowner starts with a young stand, the LTCV will increase if P େ మ increases. This effect is 8 more pronounced when carbon prices are high and starting DOM is low (e.g. below 300 tC/ha). This 9 is consistent with the results presented in other studies that show that financial returns increase with 10 The same cannot be said when a landowner begins with a mature stand. The LTCV actually 20 declines when P େ మ increases. Notice that if a landowner begins with a stand that is currently 100 21 years old with initial DOM stock of 370 tC/ha, the LTCV actually declines from 8,300 CAD/ha 22 D r a f t when P େ మ = 0 CAD/tCO 2 to 7,800 CAD/ha when P େ మ = 2 CAD/tCO 2 . It then decreases to 3,400 1 CAD/ha when P େ మ = 20 CAD/tCO 2 , and finally to 3,300 CAD/ha when P େ మ increases to 40 2 CAD/tCO 2 . These findings contrasts with results from other studies which generally show an 3 increase in financial return when P େ మ is increased. Why is this happening? A possible explanation 4 for this behaviour is that younger stands grow faster and, therefore, sequester CO 2 at a faster rate. If a 5 landowner starts with a young stand, the benefit associated with faster growing trees may be enough 6 to compensate for the carbon release charge associated with DOM decomposition, resulting in a net 7 CO 2 storage and therefore an increase in LTCV when P େ మ increases. On the other hand if a 8 landowner starts with a mature stand, the carbon benefit associated with slower growing trees may 9 not be enough to compensate for the carbon release charge associated with DOM decomposition, 10 leading to a decrease in LTCV when P େ మ increases. The same general trend is observed when 11 either a predetermined fixed baseline or a predetermined MSY baseline is used. 12 Fig. 4 is used to rank the predetermined baselines in terms of how they contribute to 13 financial returns to the landowner. The results presented in Fig. 4 are based on three predetermined 14 baselines with an initial age of 0 years and initial DOM of 0 tC/ha. The graphs were generated using 15
The results shown in Fig. 4 reveal that for any given starting condition of a project stand, the 17 financial return to carbon management is higher when a predetermined Faustmann baseline is used 18 compared to a scenario that uses a predetermined MSY baseline. As an illustration, consider a stand 19 that is currently 100 year old stand with an initial DOM of 200 tC/ha, for P େ మ = 20 CAD/tCO 2 , the 20 LTCV will be 2,000 CAD/ha when a landowner uses a predetermined Faustmann baseline and 1,500 21 CAD/ha when a landowner uses a predetermined MSY baseline. What is causing the difference? The 22 D r a f t difference in the results is due to the fact that the MSY baseline has more TEC stocks over time 1 compared to the Faustmann baseline as shown in Fig. 2 and therefore Under the same starting conditions, if a landowner chooses to use a predetermined fixed 8 baseline, it will result in highest LTCV of 3,500 CAD/ha. This can be explained by the difference in 9 carbon accounting methods employed. Whereas the periodic change in baseline carbon stocks is zero 10 for the fixed baseline approach, it is not zero in the BAU baseline approach. The gives rise to a larger 11 change in TEC stocks between the project's TEC stocks and the baseline TEC stocks for the fixed 12 baseline scenario. 13
To clarify the results presented in Fig. 4 some of the findings are summarized in Table 2 . 14 The results presented in Table 2 clearly show that when given the choice, a landowner would prefer a 15 fixed baseline to either a Faustmann baseline or an MSY baseline when provided with carbon 16 management incentives. MSY baseline is the least preferred option. The results presented in Fig. 5 suggest that the initial DOM stock of a predetermined 4 baseline significantly affects economic returns to carbon management. The results show that a 5 landowner is better off if he/she chooses a predetermined MSY baseline that has higher initial 6 carbon stocks in the DOM pool. As an illustration, consider a project stand that is currently 100 7 years old and has an initial DOM stock of 200 tC/ha and of P େ మ = 20 CAD/tCO 2 , the LTCV is 8 1,000 CAD/ha if the landowner selects a predetermined MSY baseline that has an initial DOM stock 9 of 0 tC/ha. The LTCV increases to 6,000 CAD/ha if the landowner selects a predetermined MSY 10 baseline with an initial DOM stock of 500 tC/ha. The same general trend was observed with 11
Faustmann and Fixed baselines. 12
With the type of carbon market considered here where a carbon credit is calculated as the 13 product of P େ మ and the difference between the annual changes in the project's TEC stocks and the 14 annual changes in the baselines TEC stocks, one will think that a higher initial carbon stocks in the 15 DOM pool for a predetermined will result in lower financial returns, but the reverse is true. This is 16 happening because, starting with a baseline with a larger stock of DOM will generally release a 17 greater absolute quantity of CO 2 to the atmosphere and therefore increases the absolute difference The general results presented in this study are limited to stand level analyses. We expect the 5 results to be different if a similar study is carried out at the forest-level, because of the effect of inter-6 period flow constraints imposed on forest-level models. Future research should investigate how 7 alternative silvicultural techniques could impact the choice of a baseline policy at the forest level. 8
Answers to these questions would contribute to policy discussions and advance our understanding on 9 forest carbon offset markets. Our results can also be expected to differ from other analyses because 10 of the particular form of the carbon market we assume. In this analysis, we assume a hypothetical 11 market where the landowner pays for emissions and gets paid for sequestration in the year of 12 occurrence. Other market structures such as those based on a contracted amount of carbon storage at 13 a particular point in time could lead to qualitatively different results. Finally, in this market, we 14 assume the landowner behaves like a rational landowner, in the sense of "neoclassical economics" 15 and not "behavioral economics". The results could be different if we assume behavioral economics. 16 17
Conclusions
18
A key factor in designing any credible forest carbon offset market is the choice of a credible 19 baseline against which changes in carbon stocks can be measured. This paper was set out to 20 determine how a rational landowner will behave when given the choice to participate in a forest 21 carbon offset market that considers alternative baseline policies. The purpose is to provide 22 D r a f t landowners, natural resource managers, policymakers and other interested parties, some basic 1 information on how the choice of a baseline will impact optimal harvest decision or a landowner's 2 decision to manage for carbon. The following are the main conclusions from this study: 3
(1) Alternative baselines have little effect on optimal economic rotation age. With carbon price as an 4 incentive, the choice of a baseline did not lead to any noticeable difference in optimal economic 5 rotation age. 6
(2) The study also showed that irrespective of the baseline policy, the starting conditions of the 7
proposed carbon offset project have a big impact on financial returns to the landowner. It is 8 therefore advantageous for a landowner to start with a young stand. 9 (3) In terms of ranking the baselines, the fixed baselines approach produced the highest financial 10 return to the landowner. This was followed by the Faustmann baseline and then the MSY 11 baseline. Although we showed that alternative baselines have little effect on optimal decision to 12 harvest, they have a large effect on financial return to the forest landowner. In effect, behaviour 13 changes little, but the amount of carbon offset that an emitter can claim for the same 14 management decision is significant. 15 would have been the case had the project not been undertaken. In this paper we have 2 demonstrated that the choice of a baseline will not make a difference in terms of GHG emission 3 reduction benefits, but can have a large impact on financial returns to a landowner for the same 4 management decision. Therefore, when trying to decide on the most appropriate baseline type 5 for a proposed carbon offset project, policy makers should ensure that proposed baselines do not 6 lead to unreasonable increases in financial return to landowners without making sure landowners 7 change their behaviour; since the choice of alternative baselines do not lead to noticeable 8 difference in GHG emission reduction or increase in carbon sequestration. Policy makers should 9 ensure that baselines are not set too low for landowners to receive a windfall and be rewarded 10 just for choosing a particular baseline. In contrast, a baseline should not be set too high to be a 11 disincentive for landowners to participate in the offset carbon market. These baselines will have 12 to be adjusted to ensure an even playing field. 
